In this article I present the analysis of the syncategorematic term ‘omnis’ in the commentaries on the Topics by the Parisian masters of Arts Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito. I shall focus on the different relations between subject, predicate and particular instances that obtain in universally quantified statements, and in particular on the relations that obtain in universally quantified statements with an empty subject. I also attempt to highlight some continuities and ruptures with respect to this problem (...) in its 13th-century treatments, by comparing Boethius and Brito’s analyses with the earlier analyses put forth by Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Logic and epistemology The eternity of the world Human happiness.

Summary The presentation will proceed as follows: (§ 3:) For the truth of an affirmative present‐tensed proposition Boethius required that its terms have actual referents, he would not accept any uninstantiated essence as a verifier. He also denied that any proposition about corruptible beings can be strictly necessary. He thus had a problem explaining how a theorem of one of the natural sciences differs from an ordinary contingent proposition. His rejection of uninstantiated essences also (§ 4) raised the question (...) how words can stay significant independently of the existence of referents, and more generally, to which degree language mirrors external reality. After a sketch of his solution to the semantic problems, § 5 returns to the question about scientific propositions. It is claimed that the core of Boethius' solution is a substitution of causal relationships for ordinary things (existents or essences) as an answer to the question what scientific knowledge is knowledge of and what scientific propositions are about. Since (§ 6) to Boethius axiomatized geometry provided the model for all sciences, consistency of a science's set of theorems should be important for him. A preoccupation with consistency can be seen in the rules he lays down for the dialogical game of “obligation” that was used as an academic exercise. An analysis (§ 7) of his description of another such game, the dialectical disputation, shows that he operated with a notion of truth‐within‐a‐game (requiring only conformity with the rules) as as opposed to absolute truth. § 8 claims that Boethius operated with a similar notion of truth‐within‐a‐science as opposed to absolute truth, and that his reason for so doing was the inaccessibility to human minds of the totality of causes. Doing science, then, (§ 9) is much like participating in a scholastic disputational game, and there may be scientifically‐true theorems conflicting with absolute truth known through revelation. § 10 epilogizes about Boethius' views about the highest good. (shrink)

Boethius’s short treatise On the Highest Good represents one of the remarkable and important variants of ethical aristotelianism, enriched in Boethius by neo-platonic and augustinian themes. The idea of the “philosophical way”, which exclusively can lead to blissfulness, encompassing theory as well as practice, was dismissed by theologians – counselors of Bishop Tempier. The result was an edict published in 1277, which among others condemned the ideas articulated in the treatise On the Highest Good. On closer view it (...) appears, however, that the “philosophical way” does not contradict the Christian way. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventura Boethius as a “professional philosopher” did not manage to include philosophy into theology. However, this is not to conceive the two as two contradicting disciplines, but rather as two different perspectives on one and the same thing. Therefore they can not be in conflict. (shrink)

Careful examination of the arguments used in the De aeternitate mundi attributed to Boethius of Dacia shows that this is not a work of radical Aristotelianism, but a teaching text aimed at showing students how to approach the question of the eternity of the world in their disputations. A comparison of the text with some of the articles condemned in 1277 demonstrates that the articles do not originate from the text and that the work was not targeted by (...) Tempier. What is learned from the text about disputations on the eternity of the world is then used to show another way of reading these articles which is consistent with Tempier’s assertion that they were put forward by students during disputations and to some extent enables one to reconstruct the debates as they happened. This also shows how the students distorted the arguments of their masters for their own ends, which in turn suggests how the so-called ‘double truth’ may have been inspired by the De aeternitate mundi or a text like it. Finally, this helps explain the apparent reaction against the arguments used in the De aeternitate on the part of a number of philosophy teachers during the 1270s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata by Boethius of DaciaJulie Brumberg-ChaumontBoethius of Dacia. Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata. Edited by Sten Ebbesen and Irène Rosier-Catach. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 9. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2021. Pp. 624. Hardback, 400.00 DKK.This volume offers a reliable and accurate scholarly edition of two collections of thirteenthcentury sophismata (logical and grammatical puzzles) contained in ms. Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek 509 (...) (=B) and ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana 12 sin. 3 (=F). Taken together, these two collections constitute a set of twenty-three sophismata called "Sophismata Florentino-Brugensia" in the catalogue published by Sten Ebbesen and Frédéric Goubier (A Catalogue of Thirteenth-Century Sophismata [Paris: Vrin, 2010]). These sophismata were previously available only in partial editions. Specifically, the two versions of the sophisma "Omnis homo de necessitate est animal," previously both ascribed to Boethius of Dacia, were partially edited from F by Grabmann in 1940 and from B by Roos in 1962. Other sophismata in this collection have been previously edited by Ebbesen, but their editions should now be considered "obsolete," according to the editor himself (9). Each sophisma is identified by an S followed by a number (S1, S2, etc.). In turn, each sophisma deals with several issues or problems, each one of which is identified by a P followed by a number (P1, P2, etc.). The volume is very usefully completed by an index of explicit and implicit references to other works and an index of parallel passages, both compiled by Kristian Thomsen Purreskov (591–601). Finally, this edition is accompanied by a selective but still rich index of words, where special attention has been dedicated to the sophismata by Boethius of Dacia (603–24). All the material is presented in a clear and accurate way. There are only a few minor material errors (specifically, the running titles for problems in S4 are messy; at 33, "a*" should be read as "b*"; at 49, "S14" should be read as "S18").Sten Ebbesen is the sole editor of all sophismata except for the three that deal with grammatical subjects, for which Irène Rosier-Catach is the main editor, with Ebbesen serving as a coeditor.Concerning the authorship of each sophisma, Ebbesen follows the indications contained in F, but he also provides some independent discussions (24–26). Thus, he ascribes two sophismata to Boethius of Dacia, ten to Peter of Auvergne, one to an otherwise unknown Nicholas of Normandy, and the remaining ten to anonymous masters. They are listed in detail in the "Index sophismatum et problematum" (65–69).After a summary of the contents of the volume, Ebbesen's introduction contains five sections of different lengths: first, a history of the edition (7–9); second, a general description of the structure and functioning of sophismata (9–13); third, a description of the seven manuscripts used for the edition (14–22); fourth, a discussion about authorship (22–58); and fifth, an explanation of the principles of the edition (58–62). In the third section, Ebbesen provides a wealth of information about manuscripts, stemma codicum, and evaluations of variants, especially about the relationship between S and B for the sophismata contained in both manuscripts. In this regard, Ebbesen establishes that B and F are probably not two independent reportationes of the same oral disputation, that they had a common ancestor, and that they do not depend on one another (25–32). The fourth section, about authorship, demonstrates that the collection contained in F is earlier than that contained in B. One major result is that the text copied in B (S1B) ("Omnis homo de necessitate est animal") is not by Boethius of Dacia (35). Because of F priority, that manuscript is chosen as the main witness for those sophismata or parts of sophismata that are common to F and B.The second section makes an extremely significant historical and doctrinal contribution to the history of logic, particularly the history of logical practices and their textual records. [End Page 705] Three constitutive parts of a sophisma are identified: first, the sophismatic sentence itself; second, a brief disputation (called here corpus sophismatis) about the sophismatic sentence... (shrink)

The article intends to show: a) that the modist Martin of Dacia sides with the traditional reading of the first chapter of Aristotle’s De interpretatione that we find in masters of arts from the first half of the thirteenth century; and b) that the modist Boethius of Dacia is one of the first thirteenth-century scholars to depart from this reading. In fact, Boethius presents us with an account of propositional verification where the terms’ signification is not (...) operational and where the immediate truth-maker of statements like ‘homo est animal’ is an external state of affairs. In Martin’s case, to the contrary, the terms’ signification is operational in his account of propositional verification and the immediate truth-bearer of such statements is a mental composition or division. (shrink)

The article aims to show how the acceptance of non-monotonic logic enables arguments to be held between science and religion in a way that does not exclude either of these two spheres. The starting point of the analyses is the idea of the 13th century Danish philosopher, Boethius of Dacia, who states that it is both acceptable that: a natural scientist negates that the world had a beginning, and a Christian theologian asserts that the world had a beginning, (...) because each of them is basing their statements on the principles of their respective discipline: the first on the principles of nature, and the latter on knowledge supplemented by divine revelation. What is more, analogically: a metaphysician, when limited to his principles, cannot settle the issue, as he takes into account supranatural beings and their powers, but cannot know what God or another powerful supranatural would have decided in a such a case. The paper shows that Boethius’s approach: violates the rule of monotonicity, cannot be finally interpreted in terms of classical logic and assumes certain non-monotonic logic as its inference framework. Other presented examples of arguments between religious beliefs and the statements of natural science are resolved in the same way. Thus, it is shown how non-monotonic thinking allows us to seriously treat both scientific and religious inference as compatible. (shrink)

Pagans and Philosophers explores how writers—philosophers and theologians, but also poets such as Dante, Chaucer, and Langland, and travelers such as Las Casas and Ricci—tackled the Problem of Paganism. Augustine and Boethius set its terms, while Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury were important early advocates of pagan wisdom and virtue. University theologians such as Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Bradwardine, and later thinkers such as Ficino, Valla, More, Bayle, and Leibniz, explored the difficulty in depth. Meanwhile, Albert the Great (...) inspired Boethius of Dacia and others to create a relativist conception of scientific knowledge that allowed Christian teachers to remain faithful Aristotelians. At the same time, early anthropologists such as John of Piano Carpini, John Mandeville, and Montaigne developed other sorts of relativism in response to the issue. (shrink)

"In this essay, I wish to question the view that the distinction between medieval and early modern philosophy is primarily one of method. I shall argue that what has come to be known as the modern method in fact owes much to the natural philosophy of John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361), a secular arts master who taught at the University of Paris some three centuries before Descartes. Surrounded by conflicts over institutional governance and curricular disputes, Buridan emerged as a forceful voice (...) for the independence and autonomy of teachers in the faculty of arts, arguing that philosophy as properly practiced belonged to them, the "artists artistae", not to those who taught in the so-called 'higher' faculties of theology, law, and medicine. Now such voices had been heard before at Paris, most notably from Averroist arts masters in the late 13th and early 14th-centuries.(*) Buridan is different, however, because unlike Boethius of Dacia and John of Jandun, he knew how to make the case for artistic autonomy without denigrating the theology and thereby inviting official condemnation. His trick was not to argue that there are 'two truths', one acquired and the other revealed, which might well come into conflict with each other, or that propositions whose truth has been revealed in scripture in no way qualify as scientia. It was rather to recognize the profoundly different methods of theology and philosophy, without losing sight of the fact that what counts as evidence in a proof in natural philosophy does not work in a theological argument, even if both have the same conclusion, such as that the human soul is immortal. Buridan seems to think that if only people would respect the differences between the rules of philosophical and theological inquiry, no conflicts would arise. He is not so naive as to claim this could ever happen, of course. But it does explain why he almost always diagnoses such conflicts in terms of some logical or linguistic confusion on the part of the people who propose them. Buridan is also different because in him the secularizing sentiment already present in the Latin Averroists begins to take shape as a way of doing philosophy, i.e., as a philosophical grammar.. (shrink)

The article discusses the importance of Aristotle’s teaching in the history of medieval Western scholasticism. It is suggested that two main interpretations of his theory were formed in the philosophical thought of the thirteenth century: the first conception was proposed by the teachers at the Faculty of Arts in Paris University – Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia; the other was put forward by Thomas Aquinas. Both approaches acquired particular significance in medieval culture. Boethius demonstrated the (...) social status of University Magisters, teachers of philosophy, whereas Thomas Aquinas used Aristotelian ideas in theological discourse. He explained the role of intelligence and logic in morality. It stimulated the development of new trends in Christian world view. (shrink)

This inexpensive book is an important addition to English translations of significant Latin medieval philosophical works. Boethius of Dacia for centuries has had the reputation of being, along with Siger of Brabant, a leading Averroist at the University of Paris about 1270. It is now known that Boethius was from Denmark, but not much is known about his life. It is possible that he became a Dominican in later life. The introduction to these works by Father Wippel (...) is excellent, as is the bibliography appended to these treatises. (shrink)

본 논문은 가톨릭신앙의 핵심을 다루는 1277년 3월 7일 파리대학 단죄 항목들인 “사멸한 신체가 수적으로 동일한 것으로 되돌아오는 일은 생기지 않으며, 수적으로 동일한 것이 되살아나지도 않을 것이다”와 “미래의 부활에 대해 철학자가 동의해서는 안 된다. 왜냐하면 이성으로 탐구할 수 없기 때문이다. - 이것은 오류다. 왜냐하면 철학자는 그리스도에게 순종토록 지성을 다잡아야하기 때문이다”를 중심으로 1277년 단죄 조치의 목적과 성격을 재조명한다. 이 과정에서 본 논문은 먼저 이 두 명제가 13세기 파리대학에서 활동하던 사상가들이 견지했던 사상과 일치하는 대상이 엄밀한 의미에서 없음을 보에티우스 다치아와 시제 브라방의 주요저작들을 분석하면서 (...) 밝힌다. 그리고 다른 한편으로 이 과정에서 드러나는 1277년 단죄 목록 전반의 특징인 익명성과 그에 따른 문헌학적 불명료성이 텅피에의 의도를 반영할 가능성을 모색한다. 그리고 그 의도와 관련하여 텅피에의 단죄 조치를 특정 사상가 혹은 입장에 대한 단죄보다는 파리대학의 교육과정에서 거론될 수 있는 심각한 오류에 대한 예방조치로 이해해야 한다고 제안하려 한다. (shrink)

Some interesting cases of non-monotonic reasoning have already been identified in medieval theological texts. Jacob Archambault proved in 2015 that the argumentation presented by St Anselm of Canterbury in his Proslogion has non-monotonic “embeddings”. My own contribution from 2011 indicated that we can argue that a non-monotonic logic underlies some discussions provided by St Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae, and showed that Boethius of Dacia used non-monotonic reasoning in his De aeternitate mundi. In this article, I would (...) like to briefly present these examples and verify whether we can speak about similar cases in medieval Biblical exegesis. My aim is to outline particular problems connected with the identification of non- monotonicity which are specific to theology, as well as assumptions that should be adopted to successfully discuss this issue. (shrink)

When Gilson died in 1978, a great deal of his work on the history of philosophy, and specifically God, the primacy of existence or esse over essence, and the impact of Christianity on philosophy had been translated. A significant amount of material, however, has not yet appeared into English. The publication of Medieval studies represents a vital step in bringing these important works into the English-speaking world. The opening piece revisits a battle now won (and won in great measure by (...) Gilson’s efforts), namely the fight to acknowledge the very existence of medieval philosophy and win its place in the academic world. But the article also makes the effort--which becomes a connecting thread throughout the nine articles--to pinpoint the uniqueness of what Gilson calls Christian philosophy. All the articles give an insight into the great synthetic visions articulated by the better-known works of Gilson like The Spirit of Medieval philosophy. "The Middle Ages and ancient naturalism" contrasts Renaissance humanists and Reformers with the medievals on the defining issue of their attitude toward nature to understand who actually stands closer to the Greeks. In his examination of the Latin Averroist Boethius of Dacia’s book on the eternity of the world, Gilson finds that Boethius never expresses the view attributed to Latin Averroism that there are contradictory truths in religion and philosophy. The closing article studies the profound influence of the great Muslim thinker Avicenna on Latin Europe drawing a parallel between Avicenna’s work and that of the great Christian medievals like Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. (shrink)

A questão "se uma elocução perde seu significado com a destruição das coisas "surge como uma questão sobre o valor-verdade de declarações com um termo vazio como sujeito, a saber, como um subproblema do sofisma "Se 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' é verdade quando não há homem algum ". Neste trabalho, trarei as discussões conforme elas se apresentam em "De signis" IV.2 de Roger Bacon, em "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3 de Peter John Olivi, no OHNEA de Boethius of (...) Dacia, e no OHNEA de Anonymus Alani. Tais textos nos apresentam quatro modos diversos de nos relacionarmos com a questão sobre significação para OHNEA e, assim, com quatro posições diferentes sobre a relação entre significação e referência vazia. Usarei Anonymus Alani como o fio conductor de minha análise, inserindo outras posições onde tal se fizer relevante. The question 'whether an utterance loses its signification with the destruction of things ' is raised as a question about the truth-value of assertions with an empty term as a subject, namely as a sub-problem of the sophism 'Whether "omnis homo de necessitate est animal" is true when no man exists '. In this paper, I shall introduce the discussions as they are present in Roger Bacon's "De signis" IV.2, Peter John Olivi's "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3, Boethius of Dacia's OHNEA, and Anonymus Alani's OHNEA. These texts present us with four different ways of relating the question about signification to OHNEA, and therefore with four different positions regarding the relation between signification and empty reference. I shall use Anonymus Alani as the guiding thread of my analysis, inserting other positions where it is relevant. (shrink)

A questão "se uma elocução perde seu significado com a destruição das coisas "surge como uma questão sobre o valor-verdade de declarações com um termo vazio como sujeito, a saber, como um subproblema do sofisma "Se 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' é verdade quando não há homem algum ". Neste trabalho, trarei as discussões conforme elas se apresentam em "De signis" IV.2 de Roger Bacon, em "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3 de Peter John Olivi, no OHNEA de Boethius of (...) Dacia, e no OHNEA de Anonymus Alani. Tais textos nos apresentam quatro modos diversos de nos relacionarmos com a questão sobre significação para OHNEA e, assim, com quatro posições diferentes sobre a relação entre significação e referência vazia. Usarei Anonymus Alani como o fio conductor de minha análise, inserindo outras posições onde tal se fizer relevante. The question 'whether an utterance loses its signification with the destruction of things ' is raised as a question about the truth-value of assertions with an empty term as a subject, namely as a sub-problem of the sophism 'Whether "omnis homo de necessitate est animal" is true when no man exists '. In this paper, I shall introduce the discussions as they are present in Roger Bacon's "De signis" IV.2, Peter John Olivi's "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3, Boethius of Dacia's OHNEA, and Anonymus Alani's OHNEA. These texts present us with four different ways of relating the question about signification to OHNEA, and therefore with four different positions regarding the relation between signification and empty reference. I shall use Anonymus Alani as the guiding thread of my analysis, inserting other positions where it is relevant. (shrink)

The article discusses the philosophical and theological currents that made their appearance at the university of Paris in the thirteenth century and prepared the rise of the philosophy and theology of John Duns Scotus. The principal rival orientations were newly the introduced Aristotelianism, as represented by Roland of Cremona, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and his Dominican pupils, Siger of Brabant, and Boethius of Dacia, and the traditional and conservative Augustinianism, which found its defenders above all within the (...) Franciscan order, where two schools of thought can be distinguished before Scotus: the older school culminating in St Bonaventure, and the second school, with Matthew of Aquasparta, William of La Mare, William of Ware, Peter Olivi and others. The heterodox tendencies within the thirteenth century Aristotelianism lead to an official condemnation in 1277 by Church and university authorities of 219 of its tenets regarded as erroneous, yet this fact did not stop further continuance and development of this current. After this condemnation there appeared syncretistic solutions by Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome; also mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysian inspiration (Eckhart) made its appearance. Against this background the origin and rise of the doctrine of John Duns Scotus can be explained as one more attempt to steer a middle course between the rival extremes of Aristotelianism and Augustinian Platonism and to include in a comprehensive synthesis the most valuable elements present in both currents. This attempt prepared the way for the new philosophy of the fourteenth century, although at the same time became the target of criticism by its representatives. (shrink)

A questão "se uma elocução perde seu significado com a destruição das coisas "surge como uma questão sobre o valor-verdade de declarações com um termo vazio como sujeito, a saber, como um subproblema do sofisma "Se 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' é verdade quando não há homem algum ". Neste trabalho, trarei as discussões conforme elas se apresentam em "De signis" IV.2 de Roger Bacon, em "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3 de Peter John Olivi, no OHNEA de Boethius of (...) Dacia, e no OHNEA de Anonymus Alani. Tais textos nos apresentam quatro modos diversos de nos relacionarmos com a questão sobre significação para OHNEA e, assim, com quatro posições diferentes sobre a relação entre significação e referência vazia. Usarei Anonymus Alani como o fio conductor de minha análise, inserindo outras posições onde tal se fizer relevante.The question 'whether an utterance loses its signification with the destruction of things ' is raised as a question about the truth-value of assertions with an empty term as a subject, namely as a sub-problem of the sophism 'Whether "omnis homo de necessitate est animal" is true when no man exists '. In this paper, I shall introduce the discussions as they are present in Roger Bacon's "De signis" IV.2, Peter John Olivi's "Quaestiones logicales", q. 2–3, Boethius of Dacia's OHNEA, and Anonymus Alani's OHNEA. These texts present us with four different ways of relating the question about signification to OHNEA, and therefore with four different positions regarding the relation between signification and empty reference. I shall use Anonymus Alani as the guiding thread of my analysis, inserting other positions where it is relevant. (shrink)

With the publication of these two volumes the ground has now been prepared for a long awaited event, the critical edition of the works of Henry of Ghent. Henry was one of the outstanding philosophizing-theologians at the University of Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century and, during the period between the death of Thomas Aquinas in 1274 and the ascendancy of John Duns Scotus near the beginning of the fourteenth century, no other Master surpassed him in terms (...) of influence or importance. During his tenure there as Master in the theology faculty, Henry conducted fifteen Quodlibetal disputes. His written versions of these, along with his Summa of ordinary Disputed Questions, constitute his most important surviving works. And of these, his Quodlibets rank first. Henry's philosophical and theological views were highly original and drew considerable reaction from other leading Masters of the time, especially from Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and somewhat later, from Duns Scotus. While his personal thought cannot be reduced to that of any earlier thinker or tradition, his views were heavily influenced by Augustine, by Avicenna, and by various other Neoplatonic currents. At the same time, while he was quite familiar with the texts and thought of Aristotle, he reacted strongly against the more radical form of Aristotelianism developed by Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, and other Masters in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the 1260s and 1270s. Aquinas's incorporation of many Aristotelian positions into his own thought was also suspect in Henry's eyes. Given this background, Henry himself may be regarded as an outstanding representative of the Neo-Augustinian philosophical current which surfaced at Paris around 1270, which triumphed with the condemnation of 219 propositions by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277, and which would continue to be a dominant philosophical force until the end of the century. The need for a critical edition of his Quodlibets and his Summa has long been recognized, since the only printed versions date from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In these first two volumes of Henry's Opera omnia Macken has prepared the way for the critical edition of Henry's works and especially of his Quodlibets. Here one finds a valuable catalog, based on first-hand inspection, of the widely scattered manuscripts of Henry's works. The catalog also contains expert codicological descriptions of the contents of these manuscripts, including works whose authenticity remains doubtful. Manuscripts are also considered which contain works that treat ex professo of Henry's doctrine. This is followed by an appendix which surveys ancient references to other manuscripts allegedly containing Henry's works, which manuscripts have not yet been found. Then there is a Répertoire, not of manuscripts but of Henry's works themselves, including certainly authentic works, works of doubtful authenticity, and finally, in another short appendix, works which have been falsely ascribed to him. A third part of this survey of Henry's works is devoted to manuscripts of other writers who discuss Henry's doctrine ex professo. The two volumes conclude with all the necessary indices. One must congratulate Macken for the care, the industry, and the meticulous scholarship with which he has prepared these two volumes. Not only are they of great value to anyone interested in the manuscript tradition of Henry's works and doctrine; they also include helpful descriptions of the writings of many other medieval authors which are contained in many of these same manuscripts. They will undoubtedly be carefully combed for decades to come by other scholars interested in these same authors and manuscripts. These volumes will be indispensable for libraries of institutions making any serious claim to expertise in the history of medieval philosophical and theological thought. One can only wish Macken and his international team of collaborators every success in their next immediate task, the actual edition of Henry's most important works, his fifteen Quodlibetal Questions.--J.F.W. (shrink)

Given the great amount of research in medieval logic and grammar that has gone on in the last quarter of the century, the general portraits of medieval developments in these fields found in works like Ph. Boehner’s Medieval Logic or histories of logic by Prantl, Bochenski, or the Kneales are quite out of date. This little work by Jan Pinborg, the Director of the Medieval Institute in Copenhagen, which has specialized in medieval grammar and logic, is a good update of (...) the general contributions made to these fields from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. Based on lectures given at Copenhagen and at the Christian Albrects University at Kiel, this short book indicates the interplay of the two disciplines at various historical periods of this era and highlights the contributions of Anselm, Abelard, Peter of Spain, Boethius of Dacia, Ockham, Buridan, and Burleigh. (shrink)

The author is a student of the renowned German medievalist, Josef Koch. Having himself worked for more than ten years on medieval commentaries on Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics, Zimmermann wishes to make the result of his researches available to others. To reduce his mass of material to tractable dimensions, he follows the pattern of F. Stegmüller's Repertorium of commentaries on Lombard's Sentences, giving first a description of the manuscripts examined, then a transliteration of the titles of all questions treated in (...) the respective commentaries, together with the folio at which each question begins, and grouping the works of identified authors before the anonymous works in each category. The first volume is limited to manuscripts contained in collections at Munich, Innsbruck, Cambridge, Oxford, London, Paris, and Cambrai; a second volume, with wider coverage, is promised shortly. The majority of the authors reported on in the first volume are anonymous, but those identified include Adam of Bocfeld, Augustine Triumphus of Ancona, Boethius of Dacia, Geoffrey of Aspall, John of Wacfeld, Peter of Alvernia, Radulfus Brito, Siger of Brabant, Simon of Faversham, William Bonkys, William of Chelvestun, and William of Clifford. This, like Stegmüller's, is clearly a reference work for scholars, and its principal merit lies in that it provides an accurate list of physical and metaphysical topics being discussed at centers of learning in England and on the Continent from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth centuries. It was during this period, of course, that Aristotle was having his greatest impact on Latin Christendom. The questions listed by Zimmermann have their intrinsic interest, but even more they provide historians of science and of philosophy with considerable material for investigation, for analysis, and, hopefully, for the dating and identification of the works listed as anonymous. Zimmermann makes no attempt at completeness of reference, supplying only a few citations in his notes; on Geoffrey of Aspall, for instance, he refers only to Emden's Biographical Register, missing Enya MacRae's Geoffrey of Aspall's Commentaries on Aristotle, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6. Regrettably the volume has neither a subject index nor a register of names, deficiencies that seriously impair its usefulness--W. A. W. (shrink)

This book is an extensive review & analysis of Aristotelian thought as received & adapted by such medieval commentators as Ammonius, Philoponus, Boethius, al-Farabi, Yahya ibn 'Adi, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Martin of Dacia, Simon of Faversham, John Duns Scotus, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham, & Giles of Rome. The discussions range from metaphysics to logic, linguistics, & epistemology, encompassing such topics as being, god, causation, actuality, potentiality, universals, individuation, signification, cognition, certainty, infallibility, error, (...) ignorance, analogy, grammar, interpretation, foundationalism, & the eucharist & transubstantiation. (shrink)

This book is an extensive review & analysis of Aristotelian thought as received & adapted by such medieval commentators as Ammonius, Philoponus, Boethius, al-Farabi, Yahya ibn 'Adi, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Martin of Dacia, Simon of Faversham, John Duns Scotus, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham, & Giles of Rome. The discussions range from metaphysics to logic, linguistics, & epistemology, encompassing such topics as being, god, causation, actuality, potentiality, universals, individuation, signification, cognition, certainty, infallibility, error, (...) ignorance, analogy, grammar, interpretation, foundationalism, & the eucharist & transubstantiation. (shrink)

The book called 'The Consolation of Philosophy' was throughout the Middle Ages, and down to the beginnings of the modern epoch in the sixteenth century, the scholar's familiar companion. Few books have exercised a wider influence in their time. It has been translated into every European tongue, and into English nearly a dozen times, from King Alfred's paraphrase to the translations of Lord Preston, Causton, Ridpath, and Duncan, in the eighteenth century.

In Ciceronis Topica and De topicis differentiis are Boethius's two treatises on Topics. Together these two works present Boethius's theory of the art of discovering arguments, a theory that was highly influential in the history of medieval logic. Eleonore Stump here presents the first English language translation of In Ciceronis Topica, Boethius's extended commentary on Cicero's Topica. To supplement her translation, Professor Stump has provided an introduction that supplies essential information about In Ciceronis Topica, Boethius's life, (...) and the tradition of dialectic; her detailed notes explore the many philosophical problems in Boethius's text. A significant contribution to the history of Western intellectual life in its own right, Boethius's ''In Ciceronis Topica makes an excellent companion to Professor Stump's earlier work, Boethius's De topicis differentiis. (shrink)

L'Isagoge est une introduction aux Categories. Porphyre y definit les cinq predicables (genre, espece, difference, propre et accident) et formule ce qui, grace a Boece, deviendra le principal probleme logique et metaphysique du Moyen Age occidental - le probleme des universaux -, ouvrant la querelle qui, jusqu'a la fin du XVe siecle, verra s'affronter realistes et nominalistes. La traduction francaise ici proposee est accompagnee du texte grec original et de la traduction latine de Boece.

Composed while its author was imprisoned, this book remains one of Western literature’s most eloquent meditations on the transitory nature of earthly belongings, and the superiority of things of the mind. Slavitt’s translation captures the energy and passion of the original. And in an introduction intended for the general reader, Seth Lerer places Boethius’s life and achievement in context.

Boethius composed the De Consolatione Philosophiae in the sixth century AD whilst awaiting death under torture, condemned on a charge of treason which he protested was manifestly unjust. Though a convinced Christian, in detailing the true end of life which is the soul's knowledge of God, he consoled himself not with Christian precepts but with the tenets of Greek philosophy. This work dominated the intellectual world of the Middle Ages; writers as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, Jean de Meun, and (...) Dante were inspired by it. In England it was rendered in to Old English by Alfred the Great, into Middle English by Geoffrey Chaucer, and later Queen Elizabeth I made her own translation. The circumstances of composition, the heroic demeanour of the author, and the 'Menippean' texture of part prose, part verse have combined to exercise a fascination over students of philosophy and literature ever since. (shrink)